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WHO BENEFITS?: HOW THE AIA HURT DECEPTIVELY NONJOINED INVENTORS
Jordana R. Goodman*
ABSTRACT
Congress enacted the America Invents Act (“AIA”) to bolster
economic development, sustain American innovation, and protect American
jobs. This pro-business legislation, however, overlooked one actor critical
to any successful innovation endeavor: the inventor. The AIA created
access barriers, preventing inventors from efficiently and effectively
seeking the entire remedy spectrum to which they are entitled. Paul
Morinville and others have opined that the new first-to-file system put small
inventors out of business, naming the AIA the single worst disaster in the
history of the U.S. patent system. Beyond the filing and subject matter
changes, the AIA created fundamental access to justice barriers that others
have yet to fully interrogate. Through amendments to the AIA, specifically
35 U.S.C. § 256, Congress created a system which simultaneously impedes
an inventor’s comprehension of their rights to remedy, affords greater
leeway to patent owners to protect inequitably obtained patents, and fails to
penalize bad actors.
Congress removed the “deceptive intent” language from Section 256
and formally allowed inventorship corrections regardless of inequitable
conduct. These amendments removed the choice of remedy for an inventor
deceptively overlooked in the patent process – no longer clearly presenting
their rights to pursue correction or invalidation of the patent. The
amendments hide the spectrum of remedies from the wronged actor,
providing yet another corporate advantage in the already imbalanced power
dynamic between inventor-employee and corporation-employer. Further,
Congress created an undue and duplicative litigation burden, wherein actors
can seek both patent inventorship correction and patent invalidation for
inequitable conduct in parallel litigation proceedings. Herein, I propose
amendments to reestablish the balance between inventor and corporation,
improving access to remedies and reducing duplicative burdens on the U.S.
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court system. Through these changes, the AIA can effectively bolster
economic development by recognizing and empowering inventors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2021, the University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC) settled a
nearly two-year legal battle with former professor Ashim Mitra after
accusing “the professor of stealing research from a student [Kishore
Cholkar] and selling it to a pharmaceutical company.”1 Ashim Mitra was a
professor at UMKC’s School of Pharmacy and, according to the 2019
lawsuit, co-developed a dry eye drug with his graduate student Dr. Kishore
Cholkar.2 Instead of filing a patent application with UMKC and listing Dr.
Cholkar as a co-inventor, Dr. Mitra allegedly “took Dr. Cholkar’s research
and work on this invention…and secretly sold Dr. Cholkar’s research and
related inventions to a pharmaceutical development company, Auven
Therapeutics.3 Together, Dr. Mitra and Auven filed and obtained patents
directed to the drug formulation “without naming Dr. Cholkar as an
inventor and without getting approval from the University.”4

1

Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/.
2
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo. Feb
26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
3
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo. Feb
26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
4
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo. Feb
26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
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UMKC sued Ashim Mitra, the pharmaceutical company, and other
entities in 2019, requesting judgment to correct inventorship of the patents,
declaring UMKC’s ownership, breach of contract, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and others.5 In the settlement, UMKC received $6.45
million from Dr. Mitra and gave $1.4 million to Dr. Cholkar, as well as a
promise of future royalties.6 Though Dr. Cholkar stated that he felt
“cheated” when his name was not credited, UMKC has stated that the case
is settled “confidentially and to [the university’s] satisfaction.7
Because the case settled confidentially, many questions still remain.
How much control did Dr. Cholkar have in the final settlement of $1.4
million? Why are the patents in question expected to yield future royalties
when an original inventor allegedly engaged in inequitable conduct?8 Why
didn’t the USPTO render the patents unenforceable due to this alleged
inequitable conduct?9 The answers lie within the depths of patent law.
President Barack Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA) into law on September 16, 2011.10 The AIA was recognized by
many as “the most significant reform of the Patent Act since 1952,” passed
with bipartisan support to “help businesses, inventors, and entrepreneurs.”11
The original statement from the White House highlighted many of the
changes recognized and used by most patent practitioners today: the fast
5

Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo. Feb
26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
6
Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/; Former
UMKC student will get $1.4M in Settlement with ex-Professor, Kan. City B. J. (Feb. 4,
2021), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2021/02/04/umkc-dry-eye-treatmentsettlement.html.
7
Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/.
8
Former UMKC student will get $1.4M in Settlement with ex-Professor, Kan. City B. J.
(Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2021/02/04/umkc-dry-eyetreatment-settlement.html; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2022).
9
See e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
10
President Obama Signs America Invents Act, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signsamerica-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
11
President Obama Signs America Invents Act, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signsamerica-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim (referencing Patent, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/patent (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (“The U.S.
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., was enacted by Congress under its Constitutional grant
of authority to secure for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their
discoveries.”)).
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track option for patent processing within twelve months, introducing new
ways to avoid litigation for patent validity, and harmonizing “the American
patent process with the rest of the world to make it more efficient and
predictable.”12 At least one significant change to the Patent Act, however,
went completely unmentioned in this release: amendments to 35 U.S.C. §
256 (Section 256), Correction of Named Inventor.13
Section 256 identifies when a party can correct the incorrect named
inventorship on a patent.14 Before the AIA, parties could not correct
inventorship if the “error arose [with] any deceptive intent.”15 The AIA
amended Section 256 to remove this exception, theoretically allowing
inventorship to be corrected regardless of the original intent.16 Effectively,
for the purposes of the administration, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) director does not need to consider intent in
order to correct the patent inventorship under Section 256.17
As noted in Patrick A. Doody’s Comprehensive Legislative History
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the purpose of “Eliminating the
various deceptive-intent requirements” was to move “the U.S. patent system
away from the 19th century model that focused on the patent owner’s
subjective intent, and towards a more objective-evidence-based system that
will be much cheaper to litigate and more efficient to administer.”18 The
implication herein is simple: eliminating the deceptive-intent requirements
creates a better patent system.
12

President Obama Signs America Invents Act, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signsamerica-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
13
Redline version (2011) 35 U.S.C. § 256, Correction of Named Inventor, BITLAW,
https://www.bitlaw.com/source/35usc/aia_redline/256.html (Nov. 2011) (removing the
phrase “and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part”).
14
See id. (“Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor,
or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent, the Director may…issue a
certificate correcting such error.”).
15
See id.; Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (noting that “Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court
may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence”);
16
Redline version (2011) 35 U.S.C. 256, Correction of Named Inventor, BITLAW,
https://www.bitlaw.com/source/35usc/aia_redline/256.html (Nov. 2011).
17
See id. (“the Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of
the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue a certificate correcting such
error” but removing the term “without deceptive intention” from the required facts and
such other requirements of the section.).
18
Patrick A. Doody, Comprehensive Legislative History of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, PILLSBURY LLP,
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/4/0/v2/4067/AIA-LegislativeHistoryfinal.pdf.
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This paper questions this premise on three grounds: 1) Who benefits
from eliminating the deceptive-intent requirement? 2) Who is
disadvantaged by eliminating the deceptive-intent requirement? and 3) Did
the America Invents Act actually remove the deceptive intent
requirement?19 Herein, I argue that employers such as universities and
corporations benefit the most from these amendments, with inventors
suffering from deceptive nonjoinder losing a path to remedy.20 The
America Invents Act did not remove the requirement to pursue a patent
without fraud or inequitable conduct, but rather created additional obstacles
to pursue invalidation of fraudulently-pursued patents.21
Section II provides a brief overview of the patent process,
explaining how parties pursue a patent at the USPTO and how inventors are
recognized for their efforts. Section III expands on this process, exploring
the potential and realized impact of amending Section 256 under the AIA
and through Federal Circuit interpretation. Section IV answers the
questions presented in the previous paragraph through further analyzing the
UMKC case and proposes legislative solutions to the issues at hand.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT PROCESS
To understand the impact of amendments to Section 256, it is
important to understand some of the basics of patent prosecution at the
USPTO.22 An inventor or group of inventors are eligible to apply for a
patent at the USPTO when they 1) conceive of a new and non-obvious
invention, and 2) they can describe this invention to a person having
19

These questions are inspired by Data Feminism by Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren
Klein (“This often means asking uncomfortable questions: who is doing the work of data
science (and who is not)? Whose goals are prioritized in data science (and whose are not)?
And who benefits from data science (and who is either overlooked or actively harmed)?”)
CATHERINE D’IGNAZIO & LAUREN KLEIN, DATA FEMINISM (MIT Press 2020).
20
Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc., 218 F.Supp. 2d 1243
(S.D. Cal 2002) (denying a motion for summary judgment and the motion for a stay,
“Under 35 U.S.C.S. § 256, correction of a patent is permissible only if the omitted inventor
acted without deceptive intent. Although both the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) and the district court are under the same statutory obligation to determine a
lack of deceptive intent, the PTO's procedures for determining that issue are far more
limited than those available in a district court. To show lack of deceptive intent, the PTO
requires only that the omitted inventor submit a pro forma declaration stating that the error
of nonjoinder was committed without deceptive intent.”).
21
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §2016 (9th ed. 2020) (“A finding of ‘fraud,’
‘inequitable conduct,’ or violation of duty of disclosure with respect to any claim in an
application or patent, renders all the claims thereof unpatentable or invalid.”),
22
See generally Frank W. Dingledy, An Overview of Patent Prosecution, 93 LIBR. STAFF
PUBL’NS 47 (2012).
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ordinary skill in the art, such that the person would not need to unduly
experiment to reproduce the invention.23 When applying for a patent, they
must include every inventor’s name, a description of their invention, and
claims describing what they believe to be novel about their invention.24
Inclusion of more or less than the true inventors on a patent renders the
patent void.25
Furthermore, inventors and companies must fill out information
disclosure statements, disclosing all “information material to
patentability.”26 In other words, each individual must tell the USPTO about
all information they know may “establish, by itself or in combination with
other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability” or may refute, “or
is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: opposing an argument
of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or Asserting an argument of
patentability.”27 Failure to disclose the information may be considered
fraud, bad faith, or intentional misconduct.28
Once they apply for a patent, at least one patent examiner reviews
their application and either allows or rejects the application.29 If rejected,
the inventors can refute the reasons presented for the rejection, as well as
amend the claims to put the application in condition for allowance.30
Inventors may seek the assistance of a patent attorney or patent agent to
help draft the patent application and assist in the patent examination
process.

23

Frank W. Dingledy, An Overview of Patent Prosecution, 93 LIBR. STAFF PUBL’NS 47
(2012).
24
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Position of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004).
25
Jamesbury Corp. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“While it is true that the
inclusion of more or less than the true inventors in a patent renders it void, there is a
presumption that the inventors named in an issued patent are correct.”).
26
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §609 (9th ed. 2020); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., MPEP §2001 (9th ed. 2020).
27
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §2001 (9th ed. 2020) (“A prima facie case of
unpatentability is established when the information compels a conclusion that a claim is
unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each
term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and
before any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to
establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.”)
28
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §2001 (9th ed. 2020) (“Each individual associated
with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith
in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section.”).
29
Frank W. Dingledy, An Overview of Patent Prosecution, 93 LIBR. STAFF PUBL’NS 47
(2012).
30
See id.
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In the US, many inventors have little control over their patent
application or the resulting patent. Though each co-inventor of a patent
owns 100% of the patent according to 35 U.S.C. 262, the law provides an
important caveat.31 “In the absence of any agreement to the contrary,” each
inventor has the ability to “make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented
invention… without the consent of and without accounting to the other
owners.”32 Less than 6% of all US-granted patents are owned by an
individual.33 If inventors do not own their patent, they cannot “make, use
sell, or offer to sell” their invention without the express permission of the
owner.34 These “agreement[s] to the contrary” – usually in the form of
invention assignments to companies – can leave inventors with little control
over their invention.35
Employee-inventors can assign their ownership rights to a company
in aggregate or piecemeal. A piecemeal assignment would mean that an
employee must individually assign each invention they create over the
course of their employment, and that the employee does so each time they
invent a new invention.36 This one-at-a-time formula is rare for companies,
although may be used as a supplementary assignment system. Most of the
time, employee-inventors assign their ownership rights in aggregate – and
many times as a condition of employment.37
31

35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994) (“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the
joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within
the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the
consent of and without accounting to the other owners.”).
32
Id.
33
Top Organizations 2020: Part A1-Table A1-2b, Breakout by Ownership Category, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_20.htm#PartA1_2 ; STUART
GRAHAM, CHERYL GRIM, TARIQUL ISLAM, ALAN MARCO& JAVIER MIRANDA, BUSINESS
DYNAMICS OF INNOVATING FIRMS: LINKING U.S. PATENTS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
ON WORKERS AND FIRMS (2015), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2015/CES-WP-1519.pdf.
34
James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 728, 730
(2015) (“Too many owners held exclusive patent rights that inventors sought to build
upon.”; “Patent thickets exacerbated this problem because an inventor must purchase rights
from numerous patent holders to make, use, or sell a new invention that builds upon prior
patents.”); Donald A. Degnan & Libby A. Huskey, Inventorship: What Happens When You
Don’t Get It Right?, HOLLAND & HART LLP (2006),
https://www.hollandhart.com/articles/InventorshipWhatHappens.pdf.
35
PLC Intellectual Property & Tech., Drafting Employee Work Made for Hire and IP
Assignment Clauses, PRAC. L. (Jan. 07, 2013), https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-5234246?__lrTS=20210816154323692&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&f
irstPage=true.
36
Emily A. Sample, Assigned All My Rights Away, 104 IOWA L. REV. 447 (2018).
37
Emily A. Sample, Assigned All My Rights Away, 104 IOWA L. REV. 447 (2018) (citing
Marc B. Hershovitz, Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Rights of Inventive Employees and
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As addressed in Emily Sample’s work, employers often use
overbroad assignment provisions in employment contracts, where
employees will assign all rights to “an invention that has not yet been
invented” to their employer.38 Essentially, the employee will agree to
disclose their inventions to the company, assign all rights, title and interest
to their inventions to the Company (whether or not patentable), and
acknowledge that their inventions are “’works made for hire’ (to the
greatest extent permitted by applicable law),” such that their salary is fair
compensation for their work.39 Moreover, they will usually agree to assist
the company “in every proper way to secure the Company’s rights in the
Inventions…including the disclosure to the Company of all pertinent
information and data with respect thereto.”40 Finally, many employees will
“irrevocably designate and appoint the Company...as [their] agent and
attorney, in fact” allowing them to “execute and file [patent] applications
and to do all other lawfully permitted acts to further the application for,
prosecution, issuance, maintenance, or transfer of letters patent…with the
same legal force and effect as if originally executed by” the inventor.41
In the midst of employee-inventors essentially contracting away
their rights, title, and interest to control their inventions over the course of
their employment, they do retain one important right throughout the patent
process: recognition. The USPTO will reject patent applications “for failing
to set forth the correct inventorship.”42 Patents later found to have incorrect
inventorship may be held unenforceable, to avoid invalidation, may be
corrected under 35 U.S.C. 256.43 The patent is considered invalid if every
Their Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 187 (1995)) (“In an informal survey of several
major corporations conducted by the author, every corporation contacted required the
signing of an intellectual property agreement by employees as a condition of
employment.").
38
Emily A. Sample, Assigned All My Rights Away, 104 IOWA L. REV. 447 (2018).
39
Invention Assignment Agreement, SIMUL (2020),
https://www.simuldocs.com/templates/invention-assignment-agreement (last visited Jan.
30, 2022).
40
Invention Assignment Agreement, SIMUL (2020),
https://www.simuldocs.com/templates/invention-assignment-agreement (last visited Jan.
30, 2022).
41
Invention Assignment Agreement, SIMUL (2020),
https://www.simuldocs.com/templates/invention-assignment-agreement (last visited Jan.
30, 2022).
42
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §2157 (9th ed. 2020) (For patent applications with
an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013, the USPTO will reject the application
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 115. For patent applications with an effective filing
date before March 16, 2013, the USPTO will reject the application under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102(f)).
43
35 U.S.C. § 256 (“The error of omitting inventors or naming persons who are not
inventors shall not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it can be corrected
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inventor who conceived the invention described in the patent is not properly
attributed and such improper attribution cannot be corrected.44
Note also that inventors hold power in this process. Inventors must
fill out a declaration, subject to punishment by fine or imprisonment that
they believe they are an original inventor of the “claimed invention in the
application.”45 If they do not agree to this process, the company can
attempt to circumvent them using contractual agreements such as those
described above. For example, “If a joint inventor refuses to join in an
application for patent or cannot be found or reached after diligent effort, the
other joint inventor or inventors may make the application for patent on
behalf of themselves and the omitted inventor.”46 However, to file this
substitute statement, the filer must show that they are the a party having
sufficient proprietary interest, meaning that they “have the right to
prosecute the application.”47 If they cannot show this, their application may
be denied. No matter how difficult this process may be, all inventors must
be identified on the patent application and subsequent patent; if the patent
cannot be corrected to name all true inventors, the patent is invalid.48
Although every inventor can use their own attorney through this
process, many inventors are guided by the attorney prosecuting the patent

as provided in this section.”); Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 972 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (“Precedent recognizes that a patent cannot be invalidated if inventorship can be
corrected instead.”).
44
PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Pharmacia raised, among others, the defenses that the patents were invalid for failure to
name the correct inventors, and that they were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
practiced by the named inventors during prosecution.”); Univ. of West Virginia v. Van
Voorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We therefore affirm the court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of WVU on VanVoorhies' claim that the assignment should be
declared invalid.”).
45
Declaration (37 CFR 1.63) for Utility or Design Application Using an Application Data
Sheet (37 CFR 1.76), U.S. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF., available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia0001.pdf.
46
37 C.F.R. § 1.45 (2022).
47
Daniel M. Cislo, What Should You Do if an Inventor Refuses to Sign a Declaration for
Your Patent Application?, CISLO & THOMAS LLP (June 26, 2018),
https://cisloandthomas.com/what-should-you-do-if-an-inventor-refuses-to-sign-adeclaration-for-your-patent-application/; 37 C.F.R. §1.64(a)(iii) (2022).
48
PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Univ. of W. Va. v. Van Voorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“VanVoorhies
argues that Smith and VanVoorhies had a relationship of trust concerning their inventions,
and that Smith breached that trust by inducing VanVoorhies to list Smith as a co-inventor
of the '970 application so that Smith could share in the revenues.”); Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco
Sys., 972 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“ (“Precedent recognizes that a patent cannot
be invalidated if inventorship can be corrected instead.”).
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application on behalf of the company.49 This attorney certainly must
uphold their ethical duties to “not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest,” but when applying for a patent
application, there is likely no conflict between the company’s interest and
the employee’s interest during the patent prosecution process because
everyone desires to obtain a valid patent.50 Therefore, an attorney can
represent both the company and the company’s employees.51
III. THE IMPACT OF REVISING SECTION 256
The AIA, one of the biggest changes to patent regulations in the
United States, impacted several aspects of the patent system.52 The AIA
transitioned the “U.S. to a first-inventor-to-file system from a first-to-invent
system” effective March 16, 2013.53 It introduced Post Grant Review, “a
trial proceeding conducted at the [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board to review
the patentability of…claims in a patent on any ground that could be raised
under § 282(b)(2).”54 The AIA also amended Section 256, a statute
outlining when incorrect patent inventorship could be corrected, by
removing the requirement that any inaccuracies in the original patent
inventorship claims did not stem from “deceptive intent.”55 Many of these

49

Steven L. Lovett, The Employee-Lawyer: A Candid Reflection on the True Roles and
Responsibilities of In-House Counsel, 34 J.L. & COM. 133 (2015); Univ. of W. Va. v. Van
Voorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“When patent counsel prosecutes a patent
application in the name of an inventor as required by law, that act does not give rise to an
attorney-client relationship between the entity that the inventor works for and the inventor,
thus requiring disqualification when the entity and the inventor become adverse parties.
Rather, the assignee may choose its counsel for prosecution of the applications that it owns,
and, should the entity later find it necessary to sue on the patent, it is to be expected that the
entity will choose its regular patent counsel.”).
50
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
51
Josephine Sandler Nelson, The Conflict of Interest Inherent in a Corporation Paying for
Its Employee’s Counsel, BERKELEY L. (Aug. 19, 2013, 7:41 AM),
https://sites.law.berkeley.edu/thenetwork/2013/08/19/the-conflict-of-interest-inherent-in-acorporation-paying-for-its-employees-counsel-a-better-model-for-preventing-andaddressing-corporate-crime/ (“Currently, a single attorney, as in Wood, may often
represent both the corporation and the corporation’s employees.”).
52
Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for
Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (2012).
53
First Inventor to File (FITF) Resources, U.S. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 5, 2016,
11:01 AM EST), https://www.uspto.gov/patents/first-inventor-file-fitf-resources.
54
Post Grant Review, U.S. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. (Sept. 4, 2020, 1:11 PM EDT),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/post-grant-review.
55
Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket”: The Effective Elimination of the
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716 (2012).
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changes were meant to align US patent laws with European standards and
facilitate an easier patent prosecution and litigation process.56
Many amendments, including amendments to Section 256 under the
AIA, meant to ease “correction of prosecution errors and reduc[e] litigation
burdens,” were – at best – questionably effective.57 The AIA, however, was
not the first time in US history where the provisions of Section 256 were
worsened for a non-joined inventor. It is important to understand the
history of changes to Section 256 to realize the true impact of the AIA on
the correction of inventorship.
Before the AIA, Section 256 was thought of as a “‘savings
provision’ to prevent invalidation of patent due to good faith inventorship
errors.”58 In 1983, it explicitly stated that the error of misjoinder must occur
“without any deceptive intention” and non-joinder must occur without any
deceptive intention “on his part.”59 Though the phrasing is awkward, Rival
Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prod. Co. 1973 stated that “on his part” must “both
logically and as a matter of ordinary construction, be understood to mean on
the part of the inventor(s), their employers, or their privies in interest.”60
56

Patrick A. Doody, Comprehensive Legislative History of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pillsbury LLP,
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/4/0/v2/4067/AIA-LegislativeHistoryfinal.pdf (for example, “I first supported an amendment which would have repealed best
mode in full. American patent law requires that a patent application, ‘set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention’ at the time the
application is filed. But providing the best mode at the time of application is not a
requirement in Europe or in Japan or in any of the rest of the world, and it has become a
vehicle for lawsuit abuse.”)
57
Robert A. Armitage, The Role of the America Invents Act in Ending the Plague of
“Inequitable Conduct” Allegations, 4 LANDSLIDE 1 (2012); Orion Armon, The LeahySmith America Invents Act, COOLEY LLP,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_New_Patent_Law_Explained_Panel_1Litigation_Changes.pdf (last visited on Jan. 30, 2022); Patrick A. Doody, Comprehensive
Legislative History of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, PILLSBURY LLP,
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/4/0/v2/4067/AIA-LegislativeHistoryfinal.pdf.
58
Flora M. Amwayi, Correcting Inventorship During Litigation: Why, Why, How,
FINNEGAN (July 31, 2012), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/correctinginventorship-during-litigation-when-why-how.html.
59
2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04[1][d] (Matthew Bender 2022);
Modine Manufacturing Co. v. Allen Group., 5 USPQ2d 1922, 1929 n.5 (N.D. Calif. 1987)
(citing 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04[4] at 2-45 (Matthew Bender
2022) (“While the statute seems to focus only on the lack of deceptive intent of the
inventor not named, the PTO rules provide that all the inventors sought to be named must
lack deceptive intent.”).
60
Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91(W.D. Mo. 1973) (“Although the
requirement of 35 U.S.C.S. § 256 that a correctable defect must be without deceptive
intention is phrased in terms of "on his part," such reference must, both logically and as a
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This meant that, if an inventor deceptively joined or left another inventor
off the patent, the patent could be held invalid.61
The burden to prove misjoinder to invalidate a patent is higher than
the burden to correct inventorship under Section 256.62 Those seeking to
invalidate a patent must prove misjoinder or nonjoinder through clear and
convincing evidence, whereas those seeking to correct inventorship and
leave the patent intact must only meet the preponderance of the evidence
standard.63 The inventors and assignee of the patent in question likely
would prefer the patent to remain valid, leaving the decision to pursue
invalidation or inventorship correction up to the wronged, non-joined
inventor’s discretion.64
Section 256 provides “two separate avenues for correction of an
inventorship mistake in an issued patent”: correction through the USPTO or
correction through court order.65 If an applicant pursues correction through
the USPTO, the “court may still review the propriety of the change in
inventorship” but that review will be under a presumption of validity of the
correction certificate.66 This avenue is only available when all parties
matter of ordinary construction, be understood to mean on the part of the inventors, their
employers, or their privies in interest, including any attorneys acting on behalf of the
applicant for the patent in question. The few authorities that have considered and applied
section 256 to particular facts clearly do not appear to have limited their factual inquiry
concerning conduct only to an omitted inventor.”).
61
I note that this can be perceived as a high burden, for all inventors to be acting fairly to
achieve a patent. The punishment of one actor resulting in harm to other innocent actors is
a common practice in law throughout the world. For example, a person may be required to
pay a substantial judgment, resulting in financial harm to their spouse and children who did
not participate in the action leading to the judgment.
62
NuClimate Air Quality Sys. V. M&I Heat Transfer Prods., No. 5:08-CV-0317
(NPM/GJD), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56708 at *28 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2008) (the burden to
prove misjoinder must be shown by clear and convincing evidence); Jamesbury Corp. v.
United States, 518 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“…there is a presumption that the inventors
named in an issued patent are correct.”).
63
Iowa State Univ. Rsch Found. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1971).
2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04 (Matthew Bender 2022).
64
Patents can provide money and attribution benefits, meaning those currently benefitting
from a patent would usually like to continue receiving those benefits. However, the
wronged inventor may choose between receiving those benefits as well or denying others
continued benefit.
65
2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04[2][b][i-ii] (Matthew Bender 2022).
66
2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04[2][b][i] (Matthew Bender 2022)
(citing Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 10 USPQ2d 1143, 1163 (N.D. Ill.
1988), magistrate’s rulings aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 716 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill.
1989), aff’d, 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Borden, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
381 F. Supp. 1178, 1207 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Winbond Elec. Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 262 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Modine Mfg Co. v. Allen Grp, 5 USPQ2d 1922,
1930 (N.D. Calif. 1987).
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relevant in the patent inventorship correction process (meaning all inventors
and the assignee) agree that the inventorship should be corrected in
accordance with the Section 256 certificate.67 Applicants pursue the second
avenue, correction through court order, when the parties disagree about the
desired outcome.68 This is usually the avenue to pursue when the nonjoined inventor decides to seek patent invalidation, rather than correction.
However, Stark v. Advanced Magnetics – a case where an inventor
wanted to establish that he was a sole or joint inventor on a series of patents
– effectively and improperly eliminated the invalidation choice for
wronged, non-joined inventors from Section 256.69
A. Stark v. Advanced Magnetics
Radiologist Dr. David Stark developed magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) technologies with Advanced Magnetics, Inc. (AMI).70 However, he
was not named on any of the resulting patents and sought correction, asking
to be named as an inventor on the patents.71 The Federal Circuit allowed
him to do so, saying that his allegations of fraud against the named
inventors “have implications under the inequitable conduct doctrine” but do
“not preclude him from seeking correction of inventorship.”72 Therefore,

67

Display Rsch Lab’ys, Inc. v. Telegen Corp., 133 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
Pannu v. Iolab Corp.,1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The error of omitting inventors or naming
persons who are not inventors shall not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if
it can be corrected as provided in 35 U.S.C.S. § 256. The court before which such matter is
called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and hearing of all parties
concerned and the Commissioner shall issue a certificate accordingly. 35 U.S.C.S. § 256 is
a savings provision. If a patentee demonstrates that inventorship can be corrected as
provided for in 35 U.S.C.S. § 256, a district court must order correction of the patent, thus
saving it from being rendered invalid.”).
69
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Dr. David Stark, a
physician specializing in radiology, collaborated with Advanced Magnetics, Inc. (AMI) in
developing magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technologies.”).
70
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“This work resulted in six
patents issued between September 1988 and April 1992. The patents include U.S. Patent
No. 4,770,183 (the '183 patent) and five others. This court set forth a more detailed
recitation of the factual background of these patents in Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc.,
29 F.3d 1570, 1572-73, 31 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1290, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Stark was
not named as an inventor on any of the patents.”).
71
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Stark's complaint
requested correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256. Stark also requested damages
and injunctive relief under Massachusetts tort and contract law”).
72
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
68
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Dr. Stark was able to achieve the relief he sought: receiving inventorship
recognition on the patent.73
The outcome of Stark appeared to be a fairytale ending for a
wronged inventor. The outcome in this case certainly favored Stark, but at
the expense of other wronged inventors who sought a different remedy.
Stark was recognized as an inventor on a still-viable patent and achieved
this recognition without needing his fellow inventors to attest to the equity
of their conduct.74 However, though the initial result favored Dr. Stark, in
that a wronged, non-joined inventor can be named as a patent inventor
under a Section 256 regardless of the deceit of their fellow inventors, the
result was unhelpful for wronged inventors seeking to invalidate the
patent.75
The patents now bearing Stark’s name as a rightful inventor are
likely unenforceable and, therefore, monetarily worthless.76 Under the
“[o]ne bad apple spoils the entire barrel” doctrine of inequitable conduct,
the misdeeds of his co-inventors “can affect the property rights of an
otherwise innocent individual.”77
As the Federal Circuit later confirmed in Frank’s Casing Crew &
Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Technologies, Ltd., “inequitable conduct by
named inventors in failing to name [a third person] as an inventor” rendered
the patent unenforceable, even though the third person committed no
inequitable conduct.78 Essentially, the Federal Circuit created a doctrine

73

See id. I note that, if Stark sought to invalidate the patent, he likely would have needed
to raise the allegation of inequitable conduct.
74
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (ruling that only the
inventor seeking correction of inventorship must demonstrate their lack of deceptive
intent).
75
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“patent may be
unenforceablefor inequitable conduct when any co-inventors are omitted with deceptive
intent). The standards for inequitable conduct are not likely to permit enforcement of any
patent procured by deceiving the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)”)
76
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
77
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997). I note that this can – and
does – negatively impact an inventor who was originally overlooked as an inventor during
the initial patent process. This is especially true when the overlooked inventor had little if
any power to fight for name recognition during the initial patent application process. See,
e.g., Jordana R. Goodman, Ms. Attribution: How Authorship Credit Contributes to the
Gender Gap, 2022 (forthcoming). In ruling in favor of the wronged inventor, the court in
Stark appears to have attempted to right the balance. However, because the inequitable
conduct rule is still present – and remains present after the AIA – the overlooked inventor
remains powerless to correct the conduct of her fellow actors.
78
Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs., Inc., 292 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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where inventors like Stark could pursue an expensive litigation route to be a
named inventor, only to declare that the patent was unenforceable.
This is nonsensical and, when examining the reasoning behind the
Stark outcome, the Federal Circuit clearly eliminated a true and intentional
option for resolution of nonjoinder contemplated in Section 256: allowing
wronged inventors an easy to way to invalidate a patent without bringing a
count of inequitable conduct to court.
First, when interpreting the legislative history of Section 256, the
Federal Circuit makes an implicit error. The court says that the legislative
history “strongly suggests that congress intended to permit correction of
inventorship, without regard to the conduct of the named inventor, as long
as there was no deceptive intention on the part of the true inventor.”79 The
court then cites “H.R. Rep. No. 97-542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 773 ("The commissioner must be
assured of the presence of innocent error, without deceptive intention on the
part of the true inventor or inventors, before permitting a substitution of a
true inventor's name.").”80
Though this may allow for substitution of an incorrect inventor for a
correct inventor, the very language used in Congress does not allow for one
inventor to be restored when another true inventor acted deceptively. The
Congressional record states that the absence of deceptive intent must be
shown for the “true inventor or inventors” in the aggregate.81 If a true
inventor left another co-inventor off a patent, Congress did not intend for
inventorship to be correctable under Section 256.
The Federal Circuit continued to misinterpret the Section 256
statute, in Stark, concluding that the statute “allows correction [in]
nonjoinder cases where [only] the unnamed inventor is free of deceptive
intent” on the basis of a comma.82
The legislative history suggested that Section 256 – correction of
named inventors on a patent – and 35 USC 116 (Section 116) – correction
of named inventors in a patent application – were meant “to be interpreted
in a uniform manner.”83 Section 116 (1994) read as follows:

79

Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997); H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at
2035 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 773.
81
H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 2035 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 773.
82
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
83
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]o the extent
that the language of sections 116 and 256 lead[s] to different and, arguably, inconsistent
results, a situation exists which only Congress has the power to resolve.”); see also 2
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04 (Matthew Bender 2022).
80
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“Whenever through error a person is named in an application for
patent as the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an
application, and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his
part, the Commissioner may permit the application to be amended
accordingly…”84
Section 256 (1996) read as follows:
“Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as
the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent
and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the
Commissioner may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with
proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issued a
certificate correcting such error.”85
The court determined that, because there was no comma before “and
such error arose” in Section 256, but there was a comma before “and such
error arose” in Section 116, only nonjoinder and not misjoinder cases
require lack of deceptive intent in issued patents.86 However, both
nonjoinder and misjoinder cases do require lack of deceptive intent in
pending applications.87 When combined with the above determination
regarding the extent of deceptive intent, this effectively means that the
deceptive intent of the joined inventors becomes irrelevant to a Section 256
inquiry under Stark.
This decision is sealed as nonsensical when compared to the
procedure to correct inventorship on an issued patent, outlined in 37 CFR
1.324.88 As quoted in Stark, the rule states “Whenever a patent is issued
and it appears that the correct inventor or inventors were not named through
error without deceptive intention on the part of the actual inventor or
inventors, the Commissioner may…issue a certificate naming only the
actual inventor or inventors.”89 This rule also states that there cannot be
“deceptive intention on the part of the actual inventor or inventors” and that
those non-deceptive inventors can be the only ones named on the final
certificate if the inventorship is corrected under 37 CFR 1.324 – the
counterpart to Section 256.90 Therefore, according to the legislation, when
84

35 U.S.C. § 116 (2011).
35 U.S.C. § 256.
86
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
87
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
88
37 C.F.R. § 1.324 (2022).
89
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.324)
(emphasis added).
90
37 C.F.R. § 1.324 (2022).
85
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one named inventor excluded another with deceptive intent, the patent
cannot be corrected.
The Federal Circuit disregarded legislative history, text of
corresponding statutes, and judicial history in a linguistic acrobatic exercise
to allow Stark to receive attribution for his work, knowing full well that this
attribution cannot yield further royalty rewards if the inequitable conduct of
Stark’s coworkers invalidates the patents.91 In so doing, the Federal Circuit
created a system where an inventor can use either the USPTO or the court
system to achieve name recognition on a quasi-valid patent, but an inventor
must pursue a lengthy litigation process under the inequitable conduct
doctrine to invalidate the patent. The inventor can no longer pursue patent
invalidation under Section 256 if they were without fault throughout the
patent inventorship process.
B. AIA Amendments to Section 256
Instead of restoring the choice to invalidate or receive attribution
outlined in Section 256, Congress implicitly codified the decision to remove
the option in the AIA. The option to invalidate a patent under inequitable
conduct is still available.92 However, not only did the AIA delete any
mention of such availability in Section 256, but it also codified a system
where the only way to seek the remedy of invalidation is in court.93
The amendments to Section 256 under the AIA are shown below:
“Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as
the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent
and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the
Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of
the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue a certificate
correcting such error.
The error of omitting inventors or naming persons who are not
inventors shall not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it
can be corrected as provided in this section. The court before which such
matter is called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and

91

Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“While irrelevant
to the question of correcting inventorship, Stark's allegations of fraud may (and this court
stresses "may" because it has no factual findings to reach any conclusion) have
implications under the inequitable conduct doctrine.”).
92
Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 972 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“It is the inequitableconduct rules that provide a safety valve in the event of deceit.”).
93
6A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (Matthew Bender 2022) (“At one
time, the Patent and Trademark Office’s practice was to reject pending original or reissue
patent applications if it found inequitable conduct, but, in 1988, it ceased that practice.”).
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hearing of all parties concerned and the Director shall issue a certificate
accordingly.”94
After the AIA, the reason for the originally incorrect inventorship is
not relevant to a Section 256 request for correction inquiry.95 This
streamlined the correction process from an administration and pre-litigation
standpoint, no longer requiring statements regarding the lack of deceptive
intent.96 To correct inventorship on an issued patent, the USPTO used to
require statements “from each person being added to or removed from an
application, stating that the error occurred without deceptive intent” along
with an applicant’s oath in support of the change and written consent from
assignees.97 Under the AIA, any error in inventorship can be corrected
under Section 256, as “‘Error’ is simply the incorrect listing of inventors”
and does not require proof of an honest mistake.98
This did not significantly reduce the paperwork required for
inventorship correction. 37 CFR 1.324 lays out the procedure to correct
inventorship in a patent pursuant Section 256. Like pre-AIA, requests to
correct inventorship must still be accompanied by “a statement from each
person who is being added as an inventor and each person who is currently
named as an inventor either agreeing to the change of inventorship or
stating that he or she has no disagreement in regard to the request change”
as well as a statement from all assignees and a fee.99 The AIA only
eliminated the requirement that each person must also state that the error

94

35 U.S.C. 256 (Pre-AIA): Correction of Named Inventor, BITLAW,
https://www.bitlaw.com/source/35usc/256_(pre%E2%80%91AIA).html (Jan. 2018).
95
The amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 251 and § 256 make it clear that any demonstrated
inventorship error can be corrected; either by a certificate of correction, a reissue
application, or by a suit under § 256 in Federal court. See, e.g., Vapor Point, LLC v.
Alford, 832 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (ruling on an action to correct inventorship
brought under § 256); Kevin C. McGrath &Thomas D. Kohler, Can Inventorship Be
Challenged in a PGR Proceeding?, DRM (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.drm.com/resources/can-an-inventorship-be-challenged-in-a-pgr-proceeding/.
96
Fixing Inventorship Problems in U.S. Patent Applications and U.S. Patents, RATNER
PRESTIA (2022), https://www.ratnerprestia.com/2014/02/16/fixing-inventorship-problemsin-u-s-patent-applications-and-u-s-patents/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48(a)
(2011) (pre-AIA); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48(a) (2022) (AIA).
97
Fixing Inventorship Problems in U.S. Patent Applications and U.S. Patents, RATNER
PRESTIA (2022), https://www.ratnerprestia.com/2014/02/16/fixing-inventorship-problemsin-u-s-patent-applications-and-u-s-patents/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48(a)
(2011) (pre-AIA); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48(a) (2022) (AIA).
98
Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Stark v. Advanced
Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1554-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
99
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §1.324 (9th ed. 2020).
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was made without deceptive intent.100 If an inventor refuses to sign such a
statement, their employer (the party showing sufficient proprietary interest)
may sign on their behalf.101
On its surface, the overall changes to Section 256 and similar
changes to 35 U.S.C. § 251 (Section 251) seem to facilitate an easier path to
correct inventorship for the patent owner. An owner needs one fewer
statement from each inventor and does not fear allegations of deceptive
intent invalidating their patent during the correction process. This is likely
why university and technology transfer offices advocated for removing the
deceptive intent burden since at least 2005.102 They, like other companies
attempting to profit off their employee-created inventions, are much more
likely to end the procedure of correcting patent inventorship with a valid
patent when the AIA rules apply. Other inventors listed on the patent also
benefit from this change, as the title of inventor and all attribution-related
reputation bonuses associated with being named on a patent, are more stable
after the AIA.
100

Fixing Inventorship Problems in U.S. Patent Applications and U.S. Patents, RATNER
PRESTIA (2022), https://www.ratnerprestia.com/2014/02/16/fixing-inventorship-problemsin-u-s-patent-applications-and-u-s-patents/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
101
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §604 (9th ed. 2020) (noting that “An applicant
under § 1.43, 1.45 or 1.46 may execute a substitute statement in lieu of an oath or
declaration under § 1.63 if the inventor is deceased, is under a legal incapacity, has refused
to execute the oath or declaration under § 1.63, or cannot be found or reached after diligent
effort.”). The same pattern follows under 35 U.S.C. §251, when an assignee of the patent
interest is filing for a reissue to correct inventorship instead of a certificate of correction.
Jessica L. Roberts & Adriana L. Burgy, Reissue Basics, FINNEGAN (July 6, 2017),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/prosecution-first/reissue-basics.html; JEROME
ROSENSTOCK, PATENT INTERFERENCE PRACTICE HANDBOOK §8[A], at 8-18.10 (1998 &
Supp. 2007). Before the AIA, the option to reissue the patent due to improper inventorship
was unavailable to assignees whose error arose out of a deceptive intention. Egenera, Inc.
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (For instance, through the AIA,
deceptive-intention language was removed from the reissue provision, 35 U.S.C. § 251, as
well as the analogue of § 256 that applies to patent application (footnote 4)). After
Congress passed the AIA, an assignee of the entire patent interest can correct inventorship
under 35 U.S.C. § 251 without proving that the original error was made in good faith. 35
U.S.C. §251. Moreover, because “the reissue application does not seek to enlarge the scope
of any of the claims of the original patent,” the assignee can file for the correction without
any statement from an inventor regarding the original error. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
MPEP §1412.04 (9th ed. 2014), https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/MPEP/E9_R11.2013#/E9_R-11.2013/d0e138159.html (archived edition); 37 C.F.R. § 1.172; Flora M.
Amwayi, Correcting Inventorship During Litigation: Why, Why, How, FINNEGAN (July 31,
2012), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/correcting-inventorship-duringlitigation-when-why-how.html.
102
“These changes were first proposed in section 5 of the original Patent Reform Act of
2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Congress, and have been advocated by universities and their
technology-transfer offices.” 157 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. Tuesday Mar. 8, 2011).
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Moreover, the elimination of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (Section 102(f)),
which stated in relevant part, that a “person shall be entitled to a patent
unless…he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented,”
shifted the burden of inventorship proof from a certainty to an
uncertainty.103 When the AIA eliminated this clause, they believed they
were eliminating it out of redundancy, claiming that the Constitution and 35
U.S.C. 101 (Section 101) both “specify that a patent may only be obtained
by the person who engages in the act of inventing.”104 The Constitution
allows inventors to secure for “limited Times…the exclusive Right to
their…Discoveries.”105 Section 101 says that “whoever invents or discovers
any new [invention] may obtain a patent therefor.”106 This language is
paralleled in 35 U.S.C. § 171, describing entitlement for design patents.107
The “unless” language traces its origin to In re Warner, a 1967
decision stating that the language “clearly places a burden of proof on the
patent office which requires it to produce the factual basis for its
rejection…”108 Removal of that language seems to also remove the clear
burden of proof as to which party has the burden to show proper
inventorship in proceedings at the USPTO.
Viewed in a vacuum, post-AIA Section 256 changed from a
“‘savings provision’ to prevent invalidation of patent due to good faith
inventorship errors” to a procedural statement saying that, for any reason,
inventorship can be corrected.109 To an average inventor who was left off a
patent due to questionably deceptive practices, this appears to create one
fewer avenue of remedy to pursue and, in combination with the elimination
of Section 102(f), the burdens of proof to pursue such an avenue are even
more unclear.
Instead of a deceptively non-joined inventor being able to either 1)
negotiate with their employer, asking them to be rightfully named as an
inventor in exchange for a statement saying that all inventors did not act
deceptively or 2) sue to invalidate the patent for the actions of their fellow
inventors, the wronged inventor now only appears to have the former
avenue to pursue under the wording of Section 256. This, like removing
103

Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
Joseph Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2012).
105
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
106
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
107
35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
108
Joseph Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 452 (2012) (citing In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
109
Flora M. Amwayi, Correcting Inventorship During Litigation: Why, Why, How,
FINNEGAN (July 31, 2012), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/correctinginventorship-during-litigation-when-why-how.html.
104
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Section 102(f), further muddies the waters of patent law and disadvantages
those who are not as educated about their patent rights, because deceptive
intent – now subsumed by inequitable conduct – can still invalidate a patent
under the AIA.110
The question then arises: why would a lay person’s ability to infer
their patent rights be important in inventorship disputes, especially if they
have access to a patent attorney at their company? As stated above, when
applying for a patent, most employees do not file with their own attorney or
under the advisement of their own attorney. Generally, a company hires a
patent attorney to file a patent application in the course of representation.111
The attorney represents the interests of the company and since, most of the
time, all inventors believe it is in their best interest to be named on a patent
(or in the more likely scenario, by employment contract, their belief is
irrelevant to the patent process), there are usually few objections to using a
singular attorney. Many inventors likely do not believe they need an
external attorney during this process because they believe their interests are
being met. At the time of applying for a patent, that is likely true,
especially for the inventors who are included in the process. However, that
is unlikely to be true for an inventor who was not included. For those nonjoined inventors, clear notice of rights in lay language becomes
important.112
In other words, amending Section 256 did little to help the
deceptively non-joined inventor originally left off the patent. This did not
create a “more objective-evidence-based system that will be much cheaper
to litigate and more efficient to administer.”113 This failed to give notice to
110

“The purpose of the qualification as to deceptive intent is similar to that of the doctrine
of fraudulent procurement, which is also referred to as “inequitable conduct.” 2 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.04 (Matthew Bender 2022).
111
ANDY GIBBS & BOB DEMATTEIS, ESSENTIALS OF PATENTS 230 (John Wiley & Sons
2003).
112
The USPTO has stated that “increased access to financial and educational resources”
may help to close the racial and gender patent gaps in the US. If disparate understanding of
rights and how to pursue them causes a patent gap, language that is unclear even from an
attorney’s perspective likely will further contribute to the persistent inventorship gaps. By
further muddying the waters of patent law, the AIA did not protect the interests of first
time, minority, and female inventors – or, in general, the inventors who traditionally lack
patent education equal to their privileged peers. Dianna G. El Hioum & Gregory Logan,
USPTO Has Ways to Improve Patent Diversity and Inclusion, B. L. (Oct. 13, 2021, 4:01
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/uspto-has-ways-to-improve-patent-diversityand-inclusion.
113
Patrick A. Doody, Comprehensive Legislative History of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, PILLSBURY LLP,
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/4/0/v2/4067/AIA-LegislativeHistoryfinal.pdf.
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the non-joined inventor that they had a right to invalidation of the patent,
and that the inequitable conduct of their co-inventors likely rendered the
patent economically worthless after a proceeding under 37 C.F.R. 1.56.114
This failed to restore their right to pursue invalidation through an
inexpensive procedure at the USPTO, rather than through litigation.115
Finally, because of these failures, the AIA deprives deceptively non-joined
inventors of a full review under Section 256. If there was deceptive intent,
parties could not undergo a Section 256 correction. The certificate under
Section 256 is presumed valid in the court system.116 Lack thereof may
prove an asset to bolster an allegation of inequitable conduct and
invalidation litigation proceedings, should an inventor choose to attempt to
invalidate a patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.56.
37 C.F.R. 1.56 discusses the “duty to disclose information material
to patentability.”117 It explains that “each individual associated with the
filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good
faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the
Office all information known to that individual to be material to
patentability as defined in this section.”118 It further states that “no patent
will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the
Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated
through bad faith or intentional misconduct.”119 The inventors and the
attorneys responsible for filing and prosecuting the patent application must
disclose all information material to patentability – including inventorship.120
Each inventor must be included in the patent application process, not
only because patents must disclose the proper inventorship, but also because
inventors are obligated to disclose “all information known to that individual

114

I note that, until a competitor invalidates the patent, the attribution inventors receive for
being named on a patent can be very economically valuable. See Christopher Jon Sprigman
et al., What’s a Name Worth: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual
Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2013).
115
37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2022) (noting that the fee for correcting inventorship in a patent is
$150).
116
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
117
37 C.F.R. §1.56 (2022).
118
37 C.F.R. §1.56 (2022).
119
37 C.F.R. §1.56 (2022). This duty extends beyond issuance. See Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
120
37 C.F.R. §1.56 (2022); Patent Reform Act of 2007: Report (to Accompany H.R. 1908)
(including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office) (“Disclosure of material
information concerning a matter or proceeding before the office and the absence of such
deception the office acting reasonably would on the record before it have made a prima
facie finding of unpatentability.”)
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to be material to patentability.”121 In other words, each inventor is
responsible for including information disclosure statements with all
information they know will be relevant to patentability of the claims in the
application.122 If an inventor was not included in the patent process, the
included inventors may not disclose all relevant information to the USPTO,
if only because not all of the relevant inventors had the opportunity to
disclose. The USPTO may view the inventors as all in agreement to the
patent application process – as shown by all included inventors signing
inventorship declarations – when such may not be true if all true inventors
were included.123
This is all in addition to the original materiality issue: that incorrect
inventorship by itself renders a patent invalid if it cannot be corrected.124
With the bifurcation of inventorship correction procedures and inequitable
conduct in the form of deceptive intent, the patent assignee or all inventors
currently named on the patent can seek and obtain correction of
inventorship through certification and reissue at the USPTO with no input
from the non-joined inventor.125 The wronged, non-joined inventor who
would prefer to pursue invalidation of the patent (because they view it as
economically worthless, given that their co-inventors’ inequitable conduct
will invalidate the patent as soon as a competitor discovers such conduct)
must go through an infinitely harder channel to pursue invalidation – the
court system.126
The invalidation channel is even further hidden from view after the
AIA amendments than before the AIA. Like the amendments to Section
121

37 C.F.R. §1.56 (2022).
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §609 (9th ed. 2020).
123
Declaration (37 CFR 1.63) for Utility or Design Application Using an Application Data
Sheet (37 CFR 1.76), U.S. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF., available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia0001.pdf.
124
See 35 U.S.C. § 256; 35 U.S.C. § 101; 35 U.S.C. § 171; Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 972
F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
125
The assignee may seek such correction if the non-joined inventor assigned all patent
rights to their employer.
126
See GS Cleantech Corp. v. Adkins Energy LLC, 951 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Currently, inter partes review proceedings are limited to “review the patentability of one or
more claims in a patent only on a ground that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103, and
only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” Inter Partes
Disputes, U.S. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 12, 2013, 2:39 PM EDT),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/laws/america-invents-act-aia/inter-partes-disputes.
Furthermore, inequitable conduct cannot be brought under a post-grant review. Mark J.
Feldstein, et. al., Where Are All the PGRs?, Finnegan (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/at-the-ptab-blog/where-are-all-the-pgrs.html
(“Non-statutory grounds, such as obviousness-type double patenting or inequitable
conduct, are not allowed in either IPRs or PGRs.”).
122
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102(f) discussed above, a non-joined inventor is at a significant legal
knowledge disadvantage when encountering the inequitably acquired
patent. In a company setting, they may approach the company’s patent
attorney to correct the patent, the patent attorney may approach them upon
discovering the incorrect inventorship, or the patent attorney may correct
the inventorship and never contact the non-joined inventor until after the
correction has been made. In all three scenarios, the non-joined inventor
may see the forms to correct the inventorship with the relevant law (37 CFR
1.324, Section 256, or Section 251), but will likely never know that 1) due
to previous deceptive conduct of other employees, the patent may be
deemed invalid if challenged in court and 2) they could pursue invalidation
of the patent as an alternate recourse to receiving attribution.127 The reason
is simple: it may be a conflict of interest for the company attorney to tell the
employee.128 Unless, during the joinder process, the employee seeks
independent counsel, they may not know every legal option available to
them – especially after removing the “deceptive intent” language from all
correction laws.
Moreover, even in the employee learns of their legal options during
this process, the patent owner may request a supplemental examination – a
proceeding established under the AIA – to ask the USPTO to correct their
patent in light of any inequitable conduct claims raised during litigation.129
This power is exclusively reserved for the patent owner and may be pursued
at any time after the patent issues until the patent expires or is rendered
unenforceable.130 It should be noted that only 246 supplemental
examinations were filed as of May 15, 2019, indicating that few patent
owners feel the need to seek supplemental examination to correct
inequitable conduct allegations.131 As of January 2022, there has been no

127

The second option may not be available to all inventors if the employee contract does
not allow such an action.
128
Josephine Sandler Nelson, The Conflict of Interest Inherent in a Corporation Paying for
Its Employee’s Counsel, BERKELEY L. (Aug. 19, 2013, 7:41 AM),
https://sites.law.berkeley.edu/thenetwork/2013/08/19/the-conflict-of-interest-inherent-in-acorporation-paying-for-its-employees-counsel-a-better-model-for-preventing-andaddressing-corporate-crime/.
129
Adriana L. Burgy, et. al., AIA Supplemental Examination Nuts and Bolts, Finnegan
(June 3, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/at-the-ptab-blog/aiasupplemental-examination-nuts-and-bolts-get-it-in-your-toolbox-and-dont-leave-homewithout-it.html.
130
37 C.F.R. § 1.601(a) (2022); 37 C.F.R § 1.601(c) (2022).
131
Bugry, supra note 129.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4109545

13-May-22]

WHO BENEFITS?

25

judicial decision where a supplemental examination proceeding protected a
patent from an allegation of inequitable conduct of any kind.132
This may be because, under Therasense v. Beckton, the Federal
Circuit raised the burden for inequitable conduct – requiring that the party
asserting invalidity must prove inequitable conduct through but-for
materiality under a clear and convincing evidence standard.133 This
provided yet another protection for the corporate entity and inequitably
acting inventor that went untouched by corrections to 35 USC § 256. After
the AIA, if a deceptively non-joined inventor wanted to invalidate the
patent instead of correct inventorship, they must 1) prove by clear and
convincing evidence that there was inequitable conduct that resulted in
improper inventorship 2) show by clear and convincing evidence that – if
the USPTO was aware of the omitted information (their inventive identity)
– the USPTO would not have allowed the claim, and 3) be aware of these
remedies before inventorship is corrected without their input through a
reissue.
Congress’s attempt to make an efficient system under the AIA
instead created a system where inventors wronged through non-joinder have
a more difficult time finding, understanding, and pursuing all lawful options
for remedy. Through this amendment, Congress allows the wronged
inventors an easy channel to maintain their ill-gotten patent while the
wronged inventor must pursue a higher burden in litigation from a statute
that is not readily visible in a Section 256 proceeding. It further created a
system where employers may more easily change a patent’s inventorship
when they are notified of an incorrect statement of inventorship – without
holding any responsibility for another employee’s misconduct when that
initial error occurred.
This is further compounded by the inefficient result that one party
can simultaneously correct a patent’s inventorship only to invalidate it.
IV. HARMS AND REMEDIES

132

In Supplemental Examination 96/000,018, a defendant raised a defense of
unenforceability for inequitable conduct, alleging that the declaration submitted in the
supplemental examination was false, but the district court judge ruled there was no
inequitable conduct on Oct. 6, 2018 without mentioning the supplemental examination.
133
Daniel Parrish, Supplemental Examination and Inequitable Conduct, 4 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 156 (2013). Therasense Inc. v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d
1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Jeffrey M. Jacobstein, Therasense: Raising the Bar
for Inequitable Conduct, Finnegan (July 2011),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/therasense-raising-the-bar-for-inequitableconduct.html.
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This Section demonstrates the impact of these changes through an
analysis of the UMKC case discussed in the introduction. With knowledge
imbalances and more complicated processes, deceptively non-joined
inventors are at a significant disadvantage compared to their employer and
already attributed inventors. This Section also proposes legislative remedies
to correct this imbalance and restore Congressional intent to streamline
prosecution and litigation.
A. University of Missouri-Kansas City: A Case Study on
the Wronged Inventor
News articles hailed the recent settlement where Kishore Cholkar, a
former graduate student at University of Missouri-Kansas City (UMKC),
received at least $1.4 million and a share in future revenues for patents that
his professor, Ashim Mitra, filed and obtained without 1) his or the
university’s knowledge and 2) without attributing Cholkar as an inventor.134
UMKC sued Ashim Mitra in February 2019 for, among other actions,
stealing UMKC-owned inventions, selling them to industry, fraudulently
concealing these actions, and failing to name Cholkar as an inventor.135
According to the complaint, Cholkar “conceived of a new and more
effective formulation to deliver drugs to the eye” while employed as a
graduate research assistant in Mitra’s laboratory.136 Instead of filing for a
patent naming both inventors through UMKC, Mitra allegedly “secretly
sold Dr. Cholkar’s research and related inventions to a pharmaceutical
company [and] patented the formulation without naming Dr. Cholkar as an
inventor . . .” The university received $6.45 million in a settlement and, out
of that settlement, gave Cholkar at least $1.4 million.137

134

Missouri Graduate to Share Invention Profits Under Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 3,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/technology-kansas-city-lawsuits-us-news-michaelbrown-f50f67e4c0178a2944a8ad63543b3408; Associated Press, Missouri Graduate to
Share in Invention Profits Under Deal, ABC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2021, 2:37 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/missouri-graduate-share-invention-profits-deal75664174; Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing
Research, Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkc-settles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealingresearch-receives-6-45m/.
135
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo.
Feb 26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
136
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo.
Feb 26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
137
Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/.
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Though Cholkar eventually benefitted monetarily and, under the
current law, could receive inventorship attribution on the relevant patents, a
few questions remain regarding the lawsuit and settlement.138 First, after
Mitra’s actions, are the patents in question still valid? Second, was (and is)
Cholkar aware of the potential to invalidate the relevant patents for Dr.
Mitra’s alleged inequitable conduct?139
The patents in the UMKC case are likely not viable, in that if they
are still considered an active patented case at the USPTO, a current licensee
can likely claim that the patents are unenforceable due to 1) improper
inventorship listed on the patents, 2) Dr. Mitra’s alleged inequitable
conduct, or both.140 According to the complaint, UMKC sought “correction
of the inventorship of the [patents] to add Dr. Cholkar as an inventor.”141
They did not simultaneously seek to remove Dr. Mitra from the patents,
thereby implying that he is also a rightful inventor.142
Under Section 256, Dr. Mitra’s and Dr. Cholkar’s intentions when
the patent applications were filed or issued as patents are irrelevant.143
UMKC, as an assignee of the entire right, title, and interest, can correct the
inventorship.144 However, this does not remove the stain of Dr. Mitra’s
alleged actions and, as an inventor, his inequitable conduct – if proven by
clear and convincing evidence – would likely render the patents

138

USPTO.GOV does not currently reflect an updated inventorship including Dr. Cholkar
from either of the patents in question in the UMKC suit. U.S. Patent No. 8,980,839,
inventor information (showing only Ashim K. Mitra and Sidney L. Weiss).
139
The availability of this option with respect to standing and contractual obligations
between Dr. Cholkar and UMKC will not be addressed in this Article.
140
Jill K. MacAlpine, Amanda K. Murphy, Adriana L. Burgy & Stacy Lewis, It All Starts
with Inventorship, FINNEGAN: PROSECUTION FIRST BLOG (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/prosecution-first/it-all-starts-withinventorship.html.
141
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo.
Feb 26, 2019) (Bloomberg).
142
Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo.
Feb 26, 2019) (Bloomberg) (noting that UMKC did not petition to remove Dr. Mitra as an
inventor.).
143
Leslie A. McDonell, AIA Breathes Life into Inventorship Correction in PTO, FINNEGAN
(Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/aia-breathes-life-intoinventorship-correction-in-pto.html (noting that “the AIA makes it much easier to correct
inventorship. Under the pre-AIA law, an inventorship correction required that the error had
been made without deceptive intent. The AIA removes this obstacle by striking the
language of “and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part” from both
35 U.S.C. §§ 116 and 256.”).
144
See Complaint, Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Mitra, Docket No. 4:19-cv-00143 (W.D. Mo.
Feb 26, 2019) (Bloomberg); 35 U.S.C. § 256.
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unenforceable if challenged in court.145 This challenge, if not brought by
Dr. Cholkar, will likely arise from current licensees of the issued patents,
especially given the relative cost of licensing the patent and the cost of
litigation.146
Moreover, the remedy of $1.4 million may not be the only remedy
desired by Cholkar or others in his position. Cholkar was working in Dr.
Mitra’s laboratory at UMKC and his university initially failed to protect his
interests.147 Dr. Mitra filed one of the patents in question on August 23,
2013, claiming priority to a provisional application filed on August 24,
2012.148 UMKC only sued Dr. Mitra in early 2019, leaving up to
approximately five and a half years where UMKC was not supporting Dr.
Cholkar’s rights to inventorship attribution. Still, in the settlement, UMKC
received $6.45 million and retained $5.05 million after giving
approximately $1.4 million to Dr. Cholkar.149
If Dr. Cholkar had perfect knowledge of all his options, this could
have absolutely been considered a fair settlement. If, however, he was
unaware that his testimony regarding inequitable conduct could invalidate
the patents at issue, then the bargaining position between Dr. Cholkar and
the university may have been unbalanced. For example, he could have
decided to pursue invalidation, determining that the university did not
deserve $5.05 million after their delay in support. Furthermore, without his
testimony to the contrary, the patent would likely remain viable. Knowing
this, he may have been able to bargain for more money either up-front or on
the basis of future royalties in a settlement.150 Furthermore, given that Dr.
145

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §2016 (9th ed. 2020) (“A finding of "fraud,"
"inequitable conduct," or violation of duty of disclosure with respect to any claim in an
application or patent, renders all the claims thereof unpatentable or invalid. See Therasense
Inc. v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
146
Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/ (noting that
the university believes it “could be a billion-dollar product”).
147
Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/ (noting that
Dr. Cholkar “felt cheated” and that “One professor at UMKC, Mridul Mukherji, reported
the actions of Mitra in [2016 and 2018] but little was done.”).
148
U.S. Patent No. 8,980,839, continuity data (showing priority claim to U.S. provisional
patent application 61/693,189).
149
Connor Stewart, UMKC Settles Lawsuit with Professor Accused of Stealing Research,
Receives $6.45M, UMKC ROO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://info.umkc.edu/unews/umkcsettles-lawsuit-with-professor-accused-of-stealing-research-receives-6-45m/.
150
Ethics and power dynamics regarding settlement of a civil case are well covered in the
literature and will not be discussed further in this Article. See, e.g., Heather Waldbeser &
Heather DeGrave, A Plaintiff's Lawyer's Dilemma: The Ethics of Entering a Confidential
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Cholkar’s settlement is not public, these answers will likely never surface in
this case. However, the law should anticipate that Dr. Cholkar’s situation is
not unique and empower wronged, non-joined inventors with knowledge,
options, and resources to remedy the inequitable conduct of others.
B. Outcomes and Proposed Remedies
The UMKC case in light of the history of Section 256 illustrates
answers to the questions posed in the introduction of this Article.
1) Who benefits from eliminating the deceptive-intent requirement?
Inventors who were originally attributed in the patent application filing and
assignees of the entire patent interest. UMKC can – for the time being collect royalties for their still active patents and kept over $5 million from a
settlement with Dr. Mitra. Although Dr. Mitra is receiving fewer royalties
after this case settled, Dr. Mitra is still listed as an inventor on the patents,
meaning he can still receive credit for his novel contributions and royalties
for the patent.
2) Who is disadvantaged by eliminating the deceptive-intent
requirement? Inventors who were originally not attributed in the patent
application filing due to deceptive actions of the assignee or another
inventor. In this case, Dr. Cholkar may not have known about every option
available to him and this lack of knowledge may have impacted his
settlement with UMKC. This may be especially true regarding his option to
invalidate the patents, given that the university never brought – and would
never be motivated to bring – charges of inequitable conduct in their initial
suit.
3) Did the America Invents Act actually remove the deceptive intent
requirement? No – though the words “deceptive intent” no longer appear in
Section 256, the duty to not behave deceptively when naming patent
inventors is still codified in 37 CFR § 1.56. As addressed in Frank’s
Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., decided only a few years after Stark, the
Federal Circuit determined that correction of inventorship under Section
256 could be decided separately from whether a patent was enforceable due
to inequitable conduct.151 The deceptive intent requirement for dealing with

Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL Ethics 815 (2003); James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and
Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255
(1999).
151
Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs., Inc., 292 F.3d 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
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the USPTO, therefore, resides in the duty of disclosure, candor, and good
faith in 37 CFR § 1.56.152
Herein, I propose two main remedies to rebalance remedies to
correct misattribution. First, I propose an amendment to Section 256 to
resolve notice of remedies regarding inequitable conduct, realign the section
to reflect Congressional intent, and empower deceptively non-joined
inventors. Second, I propose expanding access to supplemental
examination, allowing deceptively non-joined inventors access to both the
court system and USPTO system as inequitable conduct evaluators.
1. Section 256 Amendment
In addition to clarifying that only inventors can obtain a patent,153 I
propose an amendment to Section 256 to 1) clarify the intersection between
correct inventorship and inequitable conduct and 2) reduce the duplicative
lawsuits to correct inventorship and then render the patent unenforceable for
the inequitable conduct that caused the originally incorrect inventorship.
My proposed amendment to Section 256 is below, underlining
language I propose to add:
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the
inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent,
without inequitable conduct on the part of any true inventor or inventors,
the Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof
of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue a
certificate correcting such error.

152

PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 69 (D. Mass. 1998);
see also PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 69, 72 (D.
Mass. 1998) (citing Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997))
(resolving an inventorship dispute by determining an inventor engaged in inequitable
conduct. “Rather than resolve this action in a piecemeal fashion, I conclude that it is both
more efficient and in the interest of justice to determine whether defendants have proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the named inventors engaged in inequitable conduct
during prosecution of the patent by omitting co-inventors with deceptive intent, rather than
to permit plaintiffs to withdraw the motion to correct inventorship.”); I also note that 37
C.F.R. § 1.555 requires an identical duty of candor and good faith during reexamination
and inter partes review proceedings.
153
Dennis Crouch, With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101?
Maybe, but not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information,
PATENTLYO (Oct. 4, 2012), patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-isinventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html (showing that some attorneys believed the
elimination of 102(f) eliminates the inventorship requirement and thus will allow an
individual who is not an inventor to obtain a patent).
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This is similar to the but-for rule put forth in Therasense and
proposed in the Federal Register in 2016, proposing that “no patent will be
granted on an application in connection with which affirmative egregious
misconduct was engaged in, fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted,
or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional
misconduct.”154 Though this proposal was never adopted, the implications
of barring enforcement and validity of an application with applicants or
inventors engaging in “affirmative egregious misconduct” throughout the
patent process should be considered even more favorably if public
discovery of such misconduct occurs after the patent issues.
My proposed amendment simultaneously resolves three issues.
First, the amendment puts inventors on notice that there should be no
inequitable conduct during the inventorship process, in that the inventor
would need to sign a statement asserting the lack of inequitable conduct
during the Section 256 process. This is especially important for lay
inventors correcting a patent at the behest of a company attorney. Second,
this amendment aligns with Congressional intent to facilitate “correction of
prosecution errors and reduc[e] litigation burdens.”155 No longer can two
simultaneous litigations, one pursuing correction of patent inventorship and
the other invalidating the patent based on the underlying cause of that
incorrect inventorship, clog the already burdened US court system.156
Finally, this restores choice to the non-joined inventor in practice, allowing
them to choose between 1) inventorship recognition and 2) invalidation of
an inequitably acquired patent both at the USPTO and in court.

154

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-10-28/pdf/2016-25966.pdf; Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“the
materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an
applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art is but-for material if the PTO
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”).
155
Robert A. Armitage, The Role of the America Invents Act in Ending the Plague of
“Inequitable Conduct” Allegations, 4 LANDSLIDE 1 (2012); Orion Armon, The LeahySmith America Invents Act, COOLEY LLP,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_New_Patent_Law_Explained_Panel_1Litigation_Changes.pdf (last visited on Jan. 30, 2022); Patrick A. Doody, Comprehensive
Legislative History of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, PILLSBURY LLP,
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/4/0/v2/4067/AIA-LegislativeHistoryfinal.pdf.
156
See e.g., Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Tech., Ltd., 292 F.3d 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2002); PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (showing that inequitable conduct in intentionally failing to name a joint
inventor may result in a patent being found to be unenforceable). I will discuss duplicity of
actions in patent litigation and PTAB actions in a future work. See Anderson Corp. v. GED
Integrated Solutions, Inc., DER2017-00007, Paper 32 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2018).
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I also note that, in honor of Stark, I ensured there was a comma to
signal that the inequitable conduct exception applies to both misjoinder and
non-joinder.157
2. Supplemental Examination Reform
In addition to Section 256 reform, Congress could also reform access to
the AIA-created supplemental examination proceedings to allow both patent
owners and inventors (including those claiming to be inventors) “to request
that the USPTO review information that might later provide a basis for an
inequitable conduct allegation if left unaddressed.”158 As addressed above
supplemental examination is a tool where the USPTO can reevaluate a
patent to “consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be
relevant to the patent.”159 If the new “information presented in the request
[for supplemental examination] raises a substantial new question of
patentability (SNQ)…the patent proceeds to ex parte reexamination.”160
However, if there is no finding of an SNQ, the supplemental examination
certificate “estop[s] any future unenforceability challenges based on the
submitted information.”161 Currently, only patent owners can request
supplemental examination,162 creating an access imbalance, especially when
reevaluating whether inequitable conduct in inventorship recognition may
invalidate the patent.
If the object of supplemental examination is to “satisfy[y] a long-felt
need in the patent community to be able to identify whether a patent would
be deemed flawed if it ever went to litigation”163, then access to such
examination should not be limited to just patent owners. An expansion of
supplemental examination access, however, should not occur without
157

Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997). I expect to explore the
most impactful commas in U.S. history in a future work.
158
Michele C. Bosch et. al., A Tale of Two Supplemental Examinations: Part 1:
Unraveling Confusions, Finnegan (June 6,
2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/prosecution-first/a-tale-of-twosupplemental-examinations-part-1-unraveling-confusion.html.
159
See supra Section III B; 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2011); 37 CFR § 1.601(a).
160
Adriana L. Burgy, et. al., AIA Supplemental Examination Nuts and Bolts, Finnegan
(June 3, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/at-the-ptab-blog/aiasupplemental-examination-nuts-and-bolts-get-it-in-your-toolbox-and-dont-leave-homewithout-it.html; 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011).
161
Adriana L. Burgy, et. al., AIA Supplemental Examination Nuts and Bolts, Finnegan
(June 3, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/at-the-ptab-blog/aiasupplemental-examination-nuts-and-bolts-get-it-in-your-toolbox-and-dont-leave-homewithout-it.html.
162
35 U.S.C. § 257 (2011).
163
157 CONG. REC. S1097 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
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restriction. If supplemental examination were accessible to all third-parties,
the USPTO would become an alternative adjudicative body and may be
overwhelmed by large corporations attempting to inexpensively intimidate
less-wealthy patent owners.
So as not to open the USPTO floodgates, I propose expanding access to
supplemental examination to inventors and those alleging to be inventors.
This at least partly addresses Representative Henry Waxman’s concern that
the supplemental examination system is a ‘get out of jail free card’ for any
company fearful of having their patent invalidated because they deceived
the [US]PTO.”164 With this expansion, inventors – especially non-joined
inventors – would have access to the USPTO as a means of adjudicating
whether inequitable conduct could invalidate a patent, rather than being
limited to litigation.
These two amendments – in tandem - can mitigate the imbalanced
power dynamics exacerbated by the AIA. Through this, both the patent
owner and non-joined inventors have more equal opportunities to evaluate
and determine patent validity, and more equitable control over the resulting
consequences of that evaluation.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress must amend the AIA to realize its original goal of
bolstering economic development.165 The AIA has created an
insurmountable imbalance between inventor and corporation, allowing
companies to retain patent rights in light of inequitable conduct through
lack of transparency and accessibility. Changes to Section 256 codified a
litigation redundancy, where an actor could spend significant time and
money correcting patent inventorship while simultaneously building a case
for invalidation of that same patent for inequitable conduct. The inequitable
conduct remnant of the AIA indicates Congress’s intent to uphold the moral
code in patent pursuits. Therefore, Congress must also remove the barriers
to pursuing that moral compass.
By amending 35 U.S.C. § 256 to explicitly state that inventorship
cannot be corrected if there was “inequitable conduct on the part of any true
inventor or inventors,” inventors will be better informed about their option
to seek an invalidity remedy in the event of inequitable conduct, Congress
can reduce litigation burdens for economically non-viable and inequitably
obtained patents, and informs all actors of the importance of candor and
164

157 CONG. REC E1208 (daily ed. June 24, 2011) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
Paul Morinville, How the America Invents Act Harmed Inventors, IPWATCHDOG (Sept.
10, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/10/america-invents-act-harmedinventors/id=72551/.
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honesty before the USPTO. Furthermore, expanding access to
supplemental examination creates an accessible path to remedy for both the
wronged inventor and the company. This mitigates the “single worst
disaster in the 226 year history of the U.S. patent system” by restoring the
balance between corporation and inventor in the pursuit of equitable
inventorship recognition.166

166

See id.
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